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SUMMARY
The urgency of the crippled Skylab precipitated a massive all out effort
by NASA and many contractors to save the country's first space station. In ten
short days, hundreds of designs and materials were considered and tested.
Within about three days, the long list of possibilities began to narrow down to
about ten prime candidates, four of which were finally flown. The JSC parasol,
the NISFC SAIL 11 and the JSC SEVA SAIL were launched with the Skylab I crew.
The Skylab II crew carried a backup JSC Parasol to Skylab later, as additional
Insurance.
i
The deployment of the compact, no L; F A, JSC parasol dropped tempera-
Wres inside the OwS b y 16.7°C (30* F) in two days, but the shield deployed
only 75 percent and this, coupled with changing, cdc, caused a gradual increase
in temperature again. Ground testing also showed a decrease in breaking
strength and elongation as a result of UV /vacuum degradation which caused
some concern about the parasol strength and ability to remain intact.
The MSFC SAIL If was deployed over the parasol during EVA by the
Skylab II crew. The OWS external temperature dropped 55. G' C ( 10(' F) within
the first few hours, and the mean internal temperature dropped by 3.9° C (70F).
Deployment of this shield was less than anticipated too, being about 89 percent
deployed.
The "composite" thermal shield consisting of parasol and sail served
to shield the Skylab quite successfully, and the mission planned for Skylab was
successfully accomplished. In fact, several additional unplanned activities
were completed. The saga of the saving of Skylab will doubtless stand as an
outstanding engineering testimonial to the many dedicated engineers and scientists
from the numerous involved aerospace contractors and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
^,pE
y
The spectacular launch of the unnuuuted Skylab on hIonday, May 1.1
proceeded without a Mich. Cearby, on Pad B, a CSr%l (Command and Sery
Module) sat perched atop a Saturn IB rocket which was to carry Lac three
members of Slylab's first crew from Pad B to rendezvous and dock with Skylab,
whereupon the crew would enter the space station and activate it. Skylab would
be home to them for 28 days.
After Skylab went into almost exactly the predicted orbit, certain time
line events began to occur like clockwork. The radiator cover jettisoned, the
refrigerator system came on, the payload shroud was jettisoned, and the ATM
(Apollo Telescope Mount) deployed as planned. Just as Skylab was leaving
ground contact, there was an indication of an anomaly in the deployment of the
micrometeoroid shield. This deployable laitagu.: 6hield consisted of 2014 — T6
aluminum panels, 0.635 nun (0. 025-in.) thick, and provided a thermal control
function as well as providing micrometeoroid protection. During the ascent it
wns strapped tightly against the OWS (orbital Workshop) wall, but when deployed
it was to stand out 12. r cm (5 in.) from Skylab's skin. Word came that there was
an indication of partial and premature deployment of the shield, said that there
was also an indication of a problem with the two Workshop solar arrays. The
Canarvon and honeysuckle (Australia) tracking stations reported that there was
an indication that the solar arrays had began to deploy, but there was no indli a-
tion that deployment was complete. An hour and 38 minutes after launch, the
Flight Director of Goldstone (Calif.) sent up backup signals to activate the see-
ondary system for deploying the OWS solar arrays, bat the desired response did
not materialize. By now, serious difficulty was apparent.
With only the electrical power available from the ATAI solar arrays, the
Skylab was reduced to abouL half Lhe total I)uN%Or. As temperature data Soon
confirmed, the loss of the micrometeoroid shield daring, ascent posed an even
more immediate and serious problem. Workshop temperatures wore going out
of control.
Skylab had been designed and built with a prodominantly passive thernnal
control system, which did not require the "barbecue" (slow turning) method of
tenaperuturo control used on many previous spaeccraft. Instead, black and
white thermal control paints were used on the oxteeior to balance out the incident
solar radiation and earth' s inrrared and reflected solar radiation , or albedo.
Additionally , the Outside of Lhe OWS was covered with a goldized kapton tape
which was supposed to "see" the underside of tine micrometooroid shield (tel7011
.)
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THE SKYLAB PROBLEM
coated aluminum). This combination gave Skylab an integrated temperature
1	 condition which was biased slightly cool for internal habitability. Providing a
small amount of additional heat was deemed a more attractive solution to the
designers than providing refrigeration if the Skylab had been biased warns.
It became apparent that the vehicle attitude would have to be changed to
provide shade for the ORB, at least partially. Therefore, Use memorable
vehicle attitude jockeying contests began. Habitability experts wanted attitudes
to keep the interior of the OWS cool to prevent toxic ouLgassing of the polyurethane
foam insulation used in the OWS walls and to prevent food spoilage, while the
power management personnel wanted the ATM solar array taointed at the sun, to
get more power and keep the batteries charged. The resultant vehicle attitude
changes almost resembled a "hunting" servo system for several days wail, by
trial and error, the Optimum attitudes were finally established for best compro-
nnise conditions.
During these gyrations the CMG's (control moment gyros) occasionally
"saturated" in which case they could no longer perform their precessional
vehicle positioning task. The TAGS (thruster attitude control system) would
then have to be invoked to "unsaturate" the CMG's. Fortunately, due to tempera-
Lure conditions on the day of launch, Skylab lifted off with 355,858 N/sec (80,000
lb-sec) of total impulse rather than the red line value of 266, 893 N/sec (60, 000
lb-sec), and this proved most fortuitous in the long run. So, the untimely
departure of the micrometeoroid shield had indeed upset many of the carefully
laid plans including the systems operations and the general tine line of events
and, for a while, real time changes were the rule rather than the exception.
Dining those first trying days, the ORB external temperatures rose 11rC
(200°F) above the expected normal, and inside temperatures were finally
stabilized at approximately 52°C (125 0 F). These temperatures were high enough
in make habitability extremely uncomfortable, if not to completely preclude long
term habitability. The immediate problem became one of providing some means
of reducing and maintaining control of tte OWS Iennperature.
SOLAR SHIELD DESIGN RATIONALE
The loss of the micrometeroid shield had upset the basic thermal condi-
tioning of the OWS. A number of possible solutions were quickly conceived and
considered in some detail. One immediate idea at Marshall Space Flight Center.
(MSFC) was to cover the exposed goldized kapton with a more suitable thermal
i'
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Tcontrol material such as S-13G'. The painting schonne required the CSNI to
approach close enough to the OWS to spray on a. coat of the S- 13Cmaterial.
L111112dinte questions arose about the feasibility of spraying in hard vacuum, so
it test was conducted in which S-13G was sprayed at U. 00 13 N/cmz (10-5 torr)	 -
In a vacuum chamber. This Idea, however, never gained wide support because
of the complexity of the apparatus required to do the job and the probability of
Skylab external contamination, although it was proved theoretically possible. 	 1
In a fever pitch, Ideas involving some form of thermal shield began to
predominate around-the-clock design sessions going on simultaneously at many
contractor facilities, at Johnson Space Center (JSC) and at msrC. The thermal
shield designs evolved into three basic categories:
1. Shields requiring the use of the CSM in deployment.
2. Shields requiring extra vehicular activity (EVA) in deployment.
3. Shields utilizing the existing scientific airlock located in the wail of
the OWS, in deployment.
Because tine first two categories required EVA around the Skylab "cluster"
and because the total feasibility of Skylab EVA was, at that juncture, still
relatively unknown, tb.e ideas using the scientific airlock appeared to be intuitively
more attractive. however, regardless of deployment method, there were
certain basic materials selection criteria which had to be met. These were
as follows:
1. Light weight
3. Compact
3. Deployable
4. Good strength
1. S-13G composition is as follows: %nU-Gi percent (by weight), 11TV-Gd2-31'.
percent ( by weight), and Let ramethylguanidine and mixed annines being the
remainder. This material had been jointly developed by lice Illinois Institute of
Technology Research lustitute and the i Iarshall Space Flight Center and was
used cxtensit;, ly over the cxlerior of Skylab as a thermal control paint.
4
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5. Good a/c 2 (Preferably 0.2 to 0.3)
6. Good elongation.
7. Ultraviolet ( UV) degradation resistanee
S. 'Thermal cycling stability
0. Nonparticlo gonerating
10. Nonoutgassing in space vacuual
11. Nonflammable ( stowed), nontoxic, nonodorous
12. Nontacky
13. Acceptable"nicnnory" characteristics
Several of these material requirements deserve a brief word of explana-
tion. Items 1 and 2 are relatively self-explanatory, and were inherent
constraints imposed by Cite necessity of the packaged shield to fit fn the very
limited stowage area of the CAI for flight to rendezvous. Item 3, deployability,
was also it basic requirement, since the exposed CNS skin to be covered
actually was it projected rectangular area roughly 6 by 7.3 in 	 by 24 ft), and
transport of fixed or rigid systems of those dimensions was out of the question.
The requirement for strength is self evident, bearing in mind nevertheless
that typically small, compact, !,ad light weight systems deployable to relatively
large dimensions must sacrifice sunlethhng in terms of strength. Strength
considerations became of crucial concern later when It became apparent that
the Thruster Attitude Control System ('TAGS) on the CWS was violently flapping
the initially deployed thermal shield, but more about that later.
2. Ratio of solar ab4orptance (a ) to infrared enlittanee (c) — a measure of the
thermal performance of a nlnterial in space. The temperature of a body in space
varies as the fourth root of the ratio ce/e of the surface exposed. For example,
polished altllllillUnl foil has all of about 5, and develops it space egLlilibriUtll
temperature of about 150°C (302 0 F). A painted black body has an a/c of about
1, and would stabilize at about 25 * C (77°F). A painted white body has all
 about 0. 2, and would maintain it space temperature of nbouL -50° C (-513° F).
WilUe paints typicall y provide the best possible heat protection mechanism in
space.
5
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Good as de ratio was a Ivey factor also, and one which ter°as file precursor
to all others In the initial selection criteria. If the thermal shield wouldn't
lower the temperature, it wasn't acceptable. In fact, the changing exle of the
initially deployed parasol, coupled with incomplete deployment coverage,
finally reitutred deployment of as second thermal shield over the first. The
Prime intent hn the initial selection of materials with suitable UIC was to	 1
regain the normal OWS cool Was thermal condition.
Good elongation was an important factor too, because in the UV unta-
hibitcd environment of Skylab orbit, the danmgo to many of the materials
otherwise attractive for shield design, can be considerable. UV radiation
produces photochemical reactions in polymers (especially polyannides, Le.,
nylon), sometimes involving cross-linking, but mostly involving polymer
chain scission which is quickly manifested by a reduction in elongation and
reduced strength. As, we shall see later, appreciable effort went into UV/
vacuum testing to dete r mine degradation rates of strength and elongation, and
tests concerned with criterion number 7, UV degradation, constituted the bulk
of the massive test program carried cut during the thermal shield development
period.
Criterion number 8, thermal cycling stability was important because
it temperature excursion of about -40° C to 93° C (-40° r to +200° r) was
expected, depending on the Skylab attitude, Earth orbital position and the
material being used. Thermal cycling stability was especiatlly important to
shield designs employing coating materials Such as S-13G.
The requirement that the thermal shield be nonparticle generating and
nonouLgassing (criteria 9 and 10) came about naturally because of the sensitive
optles of the ATAI system and other experiments, and was important is order
to avoid coil tunination or thermal control surface. live ry material Selected
for use on the outside of the Skylab had to meet AISFC-SPEC-5010244'21 , a
specification which controlled the amount of outgasshng permissible from
materials to be used to the design. The the r mal shield could not be allowed to
copiously outgas. .Particulate contaminants were str ictly forbidden, since in
zero-g, particulates frequently prove to be electrostaffcally attracted to
,adjacent surfaces, and in the case of many of Lho sophistteated optical systems
used, this would seriously compromise or prevent data taking. Also, parlieu-
late contaminants are knoav i to provide attractive, but false targets for star
tracIdug hnsLrUmc:nLS to lock onto.
'Chu cm environmentcl control system imposes constraints on Lhe
flammabiliCV and toxicity crlLeria applied because the CAI em ironnacutal
control system uses relotively high partial prue flute of oxygen, which cnhances
1flammability. Since the system is closed, toxicity of the breathing air cap-
not be tolerated. The aspect of odor was also considered, although it is
highly probable that even genus mephitis would have been carried in the CM
if that would have guaranteed a Successful thermal shield!
e
Criterion 12, qontackiness, was important to shield designs employing
any land of coatings. This fact could affect deployment; it Could cause dis-
tortions of the deployed shield, or it might possibly cause coatings or thermal
control materials to stick and peel off, where coatings were used in the design.
The final requirement, the "tilemory" characteristic of the material
also proved to be important in some of the thermal shield designs because of
the material "memory" or tendency to mtura, to some degree, to the stowed
configuration or shape. Therefore, what appeared to be it relatively straight-
forward design problem to some of the enthusiastic shield designers, turned
out to ben nightmare of complexity when 4111 the Skylab-peculiar design criteria
were finally addressed.
Nevertheless, the prodigious effort of NA:A and several contractors
in the brief 10-day period between the Skylab launch and the launch of the first
Skylab crew on May 25, resulted in ten specific designs being evolved, many
to very advanced stages of development and even involving terrestrial deploy-
nrent.
We will now examine the specific designs in that Intensive effort to
provide a suitable thermal Shield.
SOLAR SHIELD MATERIALS AND DESIGNS CONSIDERED
Uppermost in all thermal Shield designer's minds was the realization
that the shield would have to survive several months in hard vacuum, with
direct impingement Of ultraviolet (UV) radiation from the sun. The degrada_
lion of material Such as nylon, due to radiation in space, is limited almost
entirely to the UV position of the solar spectrum at 290 to 400 millimicrons
UV. The visible portion of the spectrum radiation does not typically possess
enough energy, per quantum, to break chemical bonds in ordinary reactions.
Infrared and visible radiation does increase the temperature, however, and this
has the effect of increasing the reactions (degradation) initiated by the higher
7
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energy UV photons. 3 The materials ( mostly non-nlotallies to meet weight and
deployment criteria) which could be considered in shield design are many, hat
,I 	 comparison of the UV/vacuum stability properties shows clearly
the advantage of certain of the materials over others. Table 1 shows this conn-
parison for a number of potential candidates.
TABLE 1. UV/VACUUhI STABILITY OF POTENTIAL
TIIERMAL SIiIELD MATERIALS
Material UV/VaCUU111 Stability Bating
Beta Glass Fabric Good
PBI (polybenzinlidazole) Good
II-Film — Kapton (polyinlide) Good
Tedlar (polyvbnylflum"Idc) Good
Kel-F (polychlorotrifllloroctinylone) Good
Teflon TFE ( polytUrafluoroetilylele) Good
Teflon FLP (fluorinated ethylene propylene) Good
S-13G (ZuO pigment, IITV.-602 vehicle) Good
Dacron (p¢)1yeKt+'. +1. -':'1) Fair
AlUalillUll' (:U" !* "48- Fair
Poly- POI ";ylt: a(: Fair
Nylon ! j-,ulyamide) ,Fair
Myla l" (polyester fill-n) Fair to Poor
Polyethylene Poor
Polyvinyl chloride Poor
""Space Environmental Elfocts oil 	 A State of the Art pup cv"
by Pinson, Sclmmidheiscr and Zumwalt, AFDC-TR-66-12, April 1416n.
4. Sec "Effects of Vacuum — Ultraviolet .Lnvirminlont oil 	 Properlies
of Bright Anodized Aluminum Temperature Control Coatings," Jalno , 11. Wcaver,
Technical Leport AVAIL-TB-67-421, May 1968. Report concludes "The com-
billed UV/vaeuam radiation was detrimental to the solar absurpLanec of all
bright anodized alU limlul coatings "
5.	 There are aotually sovea types of nylon:
1. 1 ylon 1 front butyrulactam (2-pyrolidone)
2. Nylon 6 from polycaprolactam
3. Nylet 6-6 from hoatumetlp^lenediauninc and a dipie acid
1. Nylon 6-16 lrom hesamethy,lenediamiac and sobacie acid
5. Nylon J front 6 — amino — nonauloic acid
6. Cy 1011 11 front 11 — amino — tlndecanoic Auld
7. Nylon 121 from 12 .-- amino — Undeeanoie acid
8	 8
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Nylon 6 and nylon 0-6 ( numbers rarer to carbon rings) accounted for
about 25 percent and 75 percent, respectively, of all nylon in the U.S. last
year, and candidates were typically one or the other. Because of the double
carbon ring, Nylon 6-0 has somewhat better UV degradation resistance than
Nylon 6. All fair of the thermal shields finally selected for transport to the
crippled Skylab used Nylon 6-6 as one of the lavers in the material composite
making up each of the thermal shields; but, as we shall see later, the engineer-
ing trade-off was made differently in the case of one or the thermal shields,
when compared to the other three with regard to UV degradation.
A total of 10 thermal shield materials and/or designs were investigated
on a crash program basis, during those hectic "10 days In May:" The specific
materials, their composite construction, and their performance characteristics
can be seen in Table 2. ,ether materials besides those lis"cd in Table 2 were
considered, but obvious deficiencies such as gross overweight, inflexibility,
high probability of extreme UV degradation and of 2r factors in the screening
process narrowed the list to the above. It should be noted that the tx and e
values cited are initial properties and not the expected properties after UV/
vacuum exposure. For instance, the a/c ratio of the uunside for the GT-76
material of the parasol changed from 0.47 Initial to 0. 57 in 300 equivalent sun
hours of ground UV/vacuum exposure. This was due largely to an increase in
absorptance, which continued to change with exposure. The resulting tennpera-
ture, rise, coupled with incomplete coverage of the OWS, finally required the
deployMent of the MSFC SAIL II over the JSC parasol. Even the 8-13G material,
which had shown only 8 percent degradation in solar absorptance in 1000 hours
of ground based UV/vacuum testing, showed more rapid though still acceptable
degradation when in the 'jctual deployed position on Slylab. Subsequent investiga-
tion on returned s niple.s has shown extraneous contamination to be a factor in
the somewhat degraded solar absorptivity performance.
of the designs listed in Table 2, the JSC parasol, the LRC inflatable and
the MDAC/AIAIC inflatable were intended to be deployed through the OWS scien-
tific airlock, hence did not require any EVA. This was a distinct advantage in
the beginning, because EVA around the OWS had not yet been accomplished
(except simulated in the Neutral Buoyancy Simulator at AISFC) and there was an
element of the unlmown involved. In addition, the JSC parasol, designed to be
deployed just like a parasol, did not require pressurization, and was relatively
simpler than the other two inflatables, although it is probable that the LRC
inflatable could have been used. From A UV/vacuum degradation point of view,
however, it was believed that the parasol nylon, and certainly the LRC Kapton
would fare better over the long term than would the MDAC/1\IfiIC NIylar. USAF
datae showed a degradation of mylar from 0. 16 to 0.40 in only 1000 ESH
(evuivalent sun hours).
6. Personal communication, Warren Johnson WPAFB, May 1973, USAF Data.
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TABLE 2. COMPOSITION, WEIGHT, AND THERMAL CONTROL PROPERTIES
OF CANDIDATE MATERIALS FOR SKYLAB THEMIAL SHIELD
ApPrag,
equilibrium
InWOldun 1.IIInISSn Temp.Blture
Sid. Hiner Side III (Shit IA
Intermediate Materials W.I .ht Abeazbwncu Milloncu 1,k Metudl.l
kg/10 m ten/IW RDesig n Sun Sid. Layer(e) UWS Sid. n [ Ilattu only)
Tile Supine 1. Alaldnizc4 Side 2.4 4.9 0.20 0.07 0.42 44'e (lil'r)
2. Dacron Net
U. Al-hlylar
Scrim-AI
4. Uacioa Net
G. Tedlar
6. Ttdlor
7. Worms Net
S. Al.ldylar
Scrhn.A1
9. Uacran Net
W. HoPten Aluminized Side
JSC Pamsul 2.6 all 0.6 mii Flyby Aluminized(SChl.lduhl b11.rmrtlon4 Side 3000 0.G 1.1 0.29 0.64 0.17 We (11ek)
OT-701 Cramle
m9stw.
Nylon G-6
1.1 a.'T&
JSC SEVA Hansel I. Aluminzed(Stand Cp IAIA) Side 0.31 0.111 U.JS p9 C 110	 l°
SAIL 2. Nylon
J.	 nlyinr Alumnized Stan
JSC Ilact, up 0.5 udl 0.43.,Iydl
Pams.1 Sspton Nylon Scrim Aluminized 0.30 0.68 U.00 We (awil(SOIjuldnhl
CT-Livoo)
Ille Intiawbl. 0.5 1,111(Schl0dahi Anodized
5u1e111W Type AL 123G.0 0.5 dt Mylar Monts AL 1235.0 1.0 2.1 0.19 0.73 0.26 0'C	 0s F)
Mutorlal)
h1DAC SAIL(Armhlun) Tullon Cloth Dew Cloth WS64 2A 4.9 0.2u 0.00 0.112 22'C	 (72'0
MDAC/hIMC
Inllmablo
a. Jdulur 5 I'll Mylur 5
Exposed
Area
b. Support 5,111 blylurS L Aluminized LI 1'abd	 2.3 0.23 U.65 0.:10 Jl'C	 (set')
Tula. 51,10
CT 800 2. Dacron Net
Tune J. Emil Mylar. As	 lusted Shia 1.1 rvwl 2.3 0.23 0.65 0.00 31'C	 (SS'F)
Nine S-130
Tadlar SAILI 5mM S. LIU 2.11 TedhIr 6.1 12.1 U.IG 0.00 U.I8 .17'C	 (2'F)
hISFC S_130 roll 8-LIU 1.	 2.51011
NMI)' SAIL It Interoall.nnl
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In the aggregate, however, the parasol seemed the best of the three SAL
deployable schemes. The SEVA SAIL appeared to be a very viable contender
too. It met all the requirements, but it did require the use of the CSNI as the
means of erecting this SAIL. This scheme did provide, however, another
means of deploying a thermal shield, and for that reason, was also selected as
j'	 one of the three thermal shields which finally were stowed is the Skylab I CSNI.
On a subsequent flight ( Skylab crew 11) , in improved parasol design, using the
GT 132999, was flown. This design would have requii=-ed jettisoning of the
I' existing deployed parasol, which constituted too great a risk in the opinion of
most NASA officials.
To continue, the Boeing design came along somewhat later. Deployment
and other design details and criteria could not be worked out soon enough to
make the Alay 25 th launch.
Tile RI spring tape driven window shade scheme involved more deploy-
ment complexity, and the shield also had an extremely low a/p ratio, which.
would have biased the OWS very cool, and subsequently have required more
electrical power to produce an acceptable habitable environment inside. 'Cie
MSFC S- 13GTedlar SAIL was in the same category, giving very cool tempera-
tures, and having the additional disadvantage of excessive weight.
The MDAC SAIL used an Armalon-like material which had excellent
UV/vacuum degradation characteristics, but it suffered from another deficiency.
Test data taken at 1\1SFC in May 1973 on the optical "see thrOUgly, characteristics
of Armalon type material indicated that all 	 value of 'LO percent trans-
mission could be expected through the Armalon. This was a definite disadvantage.
The MSFC SAIL II, on the other hand, employed a thermal control material
about whioh. much was already luiown since it had been used on many spacecraft,
including Skylab. For an EVA deployed system, the AISFC SAIL II had a
relatively simple, straightforward deployment system using 2 poles locked at
their apex and a radiation resistant PBI (poly bell zimidazole) rope system which
focilitated deployment of the material much as a SAIL is hoisted — hence the
analogy.	 9
After careful and continuous scrutiny of all aspects, NASA management
wisely decided to take up to the Skylab the JSC parasol, the MSFC SAIL II and
the JSC SEVA SAIL, with deployment in that order. This scheme was jokingly
referred to as the "belt, suspenders and rope" approach — if any one failed,
there were at least two other options to effect thermal shielding of Skylab. Later
the JSC backup parasol was added, providing yet another option, if all else
failed.	 4
'a9
11
,y
The following will address in more detail the development of the two
systems ultimately employed — the JSC parasol and the MSPC SAIL II.
PARASOL AND SAIL, DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
JSC Parasol
The JSC parasol was designed to provide a 6 by 7.3 m (20 by 24 ft.)
canopy over the exposed goldized Kapton of the OWS. The parasol could be
deployed from the OWS in a "shirt sleeve" environment — EVA wasn't required,
and the parasol could be jettisoned in case of difficulty. It fit the existing TO-
27 Experiment canister, it weighed about 35. 2 kg (77. 5 pounds) including the
TO-27 hardware, and it finally was deployed through the scientific airlock (SAL)
which fortuitously for Skylab, happened to be appropriately located. Elements
of the system were the GT-76 canopy, a canopy mast, a mast hub with four
sets of deployment springs, four telescoping deployment tubes, seven extension
rods, and the TO-27 canister support tripod.
n
The deployment sequence involved the threading of the mast sections,
one at a time, through the SAL, thereby projecting the closed parasol out to a
distance of about 9.9 m (16 ft.). The telescoping tube array was then released
and the parasol was shoved out to a distance of 7.3 m (24 ft.), at which point
the deployment of the parasol began automatically. The deployment was observed
through the CShI window. The crew then retracted the parasol to a distance of
about 29.3 cm (8 in.) from the nearest point to the goldized Kapton of the OWS.
j	 a
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Because the deployment time line sequence resulted in extension during 	 '!
the darkness period of the orbit, some delay in final physical disposition resulted
when Skylab re-entered the sunlight.
ii
The basic mechanical design was ingeniously simple and straight for-
ward, and as noted earlier, did not require EVA. These were cogent and sound
reasons for the decision to deploy the JSC parasol first.
The Skylab external configuration (Fig. 1) is shown at the time of ingress
by Astronauts Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz, the Skylab I crew. At this point, the
Solar Array System (SAS) beam had not yet been released.
The general packing arrangement can be seen in figure 2. An existing 	 1
TO-27 canister was employed.
C
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Figure 1. JSC parasol external configuration at ingress.
Figure 2. JSC parasol general packing arrangement.
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The canopy rods were projected to the niaxinnun height of 7.3 m (24 ft.)
above Sky lab (Pig. 3). At this point the parasol deployment was completed, and
the retraction to the final position near the OWS skin had not yet occurred.
Figure 3. JSC parasol full extension and full deployment.
A sketch ( Fig. 1) of the unique telescoping tube locking mechanism
which projected the corners of the G by 7.3 m (20 by 24 ft.) parasol is shown.
The material used Was 6061-To aluminum.
An actual photo (Fig. 5) was taken as the Skylab I crew left Skylab prior
to the visit of the Skylab II crew. This view shows the incomplete coverage
Which resulted. The implications of this reduced shielding will be treated in
more detail later.
One of the anticipated design advantages of the JSC parasol was to have
been the ability to rotate the parasol, thereby allowing some measure of shield-
ing thermal control. After the deployment of the parasol on May 27, 1073, crew
comments and thermal instrumentation indicated that the parasol did not fully
deploy. On June 10, 1073, the crew actually did rotate the parasol in an attempt
to acquire additional z;o\,erag'e, but ground telemetry data quickly indicated that
the rotation obtained was in excess of the intended amount. The crew also noted
Increasing- OWS wall temperatures. The crew was then asked to return [lie
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Figure 4. JSC parasol telescoping tube design.
parasol to the original position, they did so, and no further attempts to use the
rotation design feature of the parasol were ever made. The sketch ( rig. 6)
is shows the planned versus the actual coverage attained by the parasol.
MSFC
The MSFC SAIL II was designed to provide a 6.8 by 7.4 in
	 by
ii	 24.42 ft.) thermal shield, or sunshade over the exposed goldized Kapton external
skin of the OWS. This thermal shield required EVA, which was performed by
the Skylab II crew consisting of astronauts Garriott and Lousma, while Coin-
mander Bean directed the operation. The SAIL design permitted either solo
deployment, or allowed deployment over the existing JSC parasol, which was
the solution fiaally adopted.
The MSFC SAIL II hardware included twenty-four 6061-T651 aluminum
pole sections, each 1.5-m (5-ft.) long, which when coupled, provided two poles
16.8-m ( 55-ft. ) long. Each pole connection had a twist loci: arrangement
featuring an extremely low temperature silicone "U' ring (SE-5211) which
15 4
Figure 5. Skylab in deployment 1):11: ► .,ul configuration.
retained it: clastonrcric 1) opurties and n ► :,intained the locked position while the-
.Skyl:)b was thermal cycled mid maneuvered. other hardware included two pallets
for Dole stowage, a Dole base plate with a locking feature to provide accurate
5A11. positioning, a portable foot r •cstraint a(1al)ter Which was used with a uni-
vcrs::l foot restrainl from the (AVS, and two I'M (polybenzimid: ► zolc) solar
radiation resisL ► nt "rlothc:.Iinc" roles in nun-fl: ► mnu ► ble fiber • P-1 1:1ss bag,; , to
crve as halyards. Te: tint; of, teflun coated fiburglass ropes showed inferior
wi-formance with rc;;:rrd to panic ie uncration. 'ne SAIL itself was stowcd in
a nonflarnmable fiberglass INag. The finished package weighed 50. S k; ( 1 121 lb),
the SAIL, accounting for 11).5 kg (1:1 lb) of Ow 54). ; kg ( 112 ib).
The 5AI1. prelmr: ► tion steps involved sewing; 0.9 -111 (:1-11.) wide NN11)
rnateriai together with sl)ecial solar radiation resistant N111 thread,
lli
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Figure G. JSC parasol coverage comparison (actual vs. planned).
1
commercial sewing machines. Skilled seamstresses from International Later
Co., employed by the Johnson Space Center for space suit work, were dispatched
by JSC and horridly flown to the Marshall Space Flight Center, because the
critical seamstress skill was the one thing MSFC did not have available. The
SAIL edges were folded and sewn to accommodate a PBI rope guide, and grom-
mets were sewn into each reinforced corner to provide means of attaching PBI
strappings.
The thermal control material, S-13G, was sprayed onto the flight SAIL
in two coats, after a primer coat of GI SS4044 had been applied. After the
first SAIL had been hand sprayed in the down position, subsequent SAILS were
sprayed with the N&ID material in the vertical position to improve the quality.
A total of four SAILS were made for potential use.
'
	
	
The press of the impending launch of the Skylab I crew provided constant
pressure for speed in the design and development. The flight SAIL had a cure
time of 57 hours before folding, and then 76 additional days in the folded condi-
tion before use.
4
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Following room temperature curing, the SAIL was hoisted to the vertical
position again where the 111ylar side (GNVS facing side) Was wiped with alcohol
dampened cloths. The sunsido S-13G material Was carefully dry wiped only.
The folding operation Was done hN, a group of U.S. Navy resident under-
water simulation training personnel (Sea] 'ream), Who Were also professional
parachute riggers. A unique "accordiun" fold Was specially developed Which
proclu!ed air entrapment in the pack:19L. The packaged SAIL was then placed
in a Vacuunn chamber which was eVncuated to 3. 7 Win ) (5 x 10-2 tore) in order
to extract all air and to collapse the folded material to the ultimate. After
removal from the Vacutmn chamber, the package Was a compact 35. G by 31.3
by 20. 3 em (14 by 13. 5 by S in.), and the SAIL folds excluded atmospheric pres-
sure sufficiently so that subsequent exposure to the 3.4-Nlonu 2 (5-psia) environ-
ment of the CM and the GWS did not cause the package to balloon or to burst.
This is just .mother ex.umple Of One of '.•e many deceptively simple details, not
a single one of which could be forgotten or overlooked, if a successful operation
Was to result.
An unbelievable number and variety of SAIL deployment tests were con-
dueled in those all too brief few clays in Alay of 1076. The design data require-
nnents were drivers for tests Which were conducted in that period at AISF C,
while similar tests oriented along the JSC parasol lines Were boing conducted
at JSC.
The Appendix constitutes a summary of the MSFC development tests. JSC
also conducted development testing, While tests were also being conducted on
UV degradation simultaneously at many other instailations. 7 JSC and MSFC, in
particular, were in continuous contact during the thermal shield development.
11ISFC benefitted considerably by the variety of special materials and talent
provided by the Sister Center, JSC.
The general arrangement and location of the bISFC SAIL II apparatus
can be seen in Figure 7.
Design details of the SAIL poles are shown in Figure S. Ili testing,it
was found that the luiurled nuts tended to back off and work loose. Special
locldng C rings were designed and nnanufactured to prevent this.
7. UV degradation testing of GT-76 material was conducted by Thompson Ramo
Woolridge, Arnold Engineering Development Center, Goddard Space Flight
Center ( NASA), Lewis Research Center (NASA), and Johnson Space Center
( NASA).
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Figure 7. AlSFC SAIL II arrangement.
The pole baseplate (Fig, U) shows only oue of the hole sections inserted.
A typical eyed-end fitting and the 1313I halyard rope call be seen in the foreground.
The Navy Seal Team parachute riggers (Fig. IU) are at work applying
the special accordion fold technique during the SAIL packing.
The MSFC SAIL It in the final packed configuration (Fig. 11) is shown
before insertion into the Beta cloth (fiberglass) bag.
A SAIL undergoing a cleliloynacnt test ( Fig. 12) is shown in which the
Clow of the SAIL material from the bag was being checked. This view is from the
Gw'S side, and the white S-13G material faces the deployment test engineers.
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Figure	 SAIL, deployment from beta cloth bag test.
A full scale dcpl')ymcnt test ( Fig. 1:1) was conducted at NIShC. This
was the final check oil backup SAI1. to delerr nrir►e positk ely th; ► t there would
be no sticking of the thermal control surfaces during deployment. This w;rs
also the final deployment orientation session for the Skylab lI crew, who finally
deployed the SAIL, oil
The actual deployment proceeded as follows:
Initially , all the required equipment was attached in the Fixed Airliwk
Shroud ( FAS), and a crewman moved to the area where the sunshade EVA
workstation was to be r ► rounted oil 	 ATNI truss. Then the foot restraints, the
sunshade basep;ate, and the sunshade bat; assembly were transferred to the
crewn ► ; ► n in the sunshade workstation area by means of lire transfer boom. Sub-
Sequently, the foot restraint and baseplate were attached to the truss. The crew-
111,111 in the FAA assembled the poles ;rnd transferred them to the other crewn ► :u ►
who placed them into the baseplate. Following this, the sunshade was attached
to the halyards on the pole assemblies and the sunshade was deployed from the
bap;, out the length of the poles. Finall y ' the crewman positioned the forward
edge of the stuff shad . , ► ainst the (AVS aft skirt over the parasol, tied off the
reefing lines to the ATM truss and then returned to the airlock.
22
y
Figure 1:3. Final backup SAIL, deployment and Skylab 11
crew training; exercise.
F ig;u ► •e 1 .1 shows the deployed DISFC SAIL 11. The material "n ►en ► ory"
characteristic and evidentl y a slight excess of material caused some slight
accordioning; of the deulgyed SAIL. Subsequent measurements in the plan view,
of photographs taken during; the Skylab III crcw flN'-around, showed that 89 per-
cent of lic expected coverage had been Atainc4l. In retrospect, it is hig;hly
probable that the 7 ► ; da'v -4owag;e period in the tr, ► cked, partially evacuated con-
dition, caused some material set, but in the briif 1: 1 day design, development
and test period available before the launch of the SI:^'lab I crew, no meaningful
If aceelerated" a ping;', X r "nieniory" tests could be devised. Short tine me mory
and aging; tests of witness specimens did not exhibit the a;,'cord ► oning; tei ►denc}'.
The g;ener;iI performance of the thernu ► I shields %%i11 be discussed next.
PERFORMANCE OF SKYLAB THERMAL SHIELDS
Tenlpera ► tures inside the Skvla l) those first hours rose to unanticipated
peaks, even exceeding; the limit of the interior sensors, which wa y' about 48.9°C
(1.:U° F). fortunately, an elaborate computerized thernu ► I model had been
L-
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Figure 11. NIS C ~:111. 11 dcl ► lo cil on sk. hb.
► le\elopt-d ill advance by thernull engineer's al NIS ('. BY sclplil\ ing lelentcteretl
Bala to ll ► i^ 111(del, tcnll ►el:Ilure • could be predicted lo :1 certain ex(ent, \\hen
other \ali:Ible• such as tike lal ► altilude, lw	 of Ow nlieror ► leteoruid	 .11111
other vari.lhles \\erc fed in. The illilial studhe" ,hu\\cd that ullic."s urhit;li
altitude was ch:inged, the nu`:ul iotern:ll telul ►erature was lil.ch to rc:lch i 1. 1'C•
Hill ' I') 11th'ill the fir st Ill days. This r .1\ v	 ;1hollt food ", t oned
ill the food contAllcr• :Irnl scientific experilu( • nt tillll Stored in the film locker'.
The footI amt film con I;iiners reached .55.(;" C ant] 50 0 C ( 13.!" 1'' ;md 1'22'F)
resp(
 ctivel,\', lint before the parasol was deplo\^ed. The para " ol deploYmcnt
4I1-opped t11c foo ► I :nut film colitAllers temperature to:ipproxinlalel\ '_'i °C (so °l1,
ext'el ► I fur' a feW time~ later \\hen high 110:1 angle,, were cillploved. The I 1c4a
:Mlle refer- lu the acute ;IIIAIe between 1'::11-111 ~till line :111d otI ► ilal phllc, high
Bela angles allowing corresponding increa-'ed heating of Skylab.
The cm. k parasoi tic 1 1m lilt-lit inured negligible ► tamale to food anti fills.
\n tit lit , r ScriouS lu ► Icntial I)I-00lent rest lt(K1 from high internal lenll\craturc..
Interior (AVS \r:111 IemperaUlres of 1;1"°C (270' F) were reached, t'ausin., ,.eriurl.
con g ers Ilbout the possil ,ility of TDI (toluene thisoevanate) evolving from the
aluntinunl - foil-cuvcrell l ►ul^'.tmth:Ine 1'uanl. Designers :list) worried about the
1I^
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complete loss of the Lefhcoweld 109 adhe" ive bond to the OWS interior, and pos-
sible displacement of interior insulation.	 Real time, crash program tests of
OWS sidn sections, fabricated at the same time as the orbiting OWS, showed
that blistering of the foil overcoat would occur, but "the wall should remain
integral, and could be expected to meet the normal insulative and structural
requirements to be expected in the mission: " 8 	j
The same report concluded that no appreciable TDI from the OWS foam
would be emitted below approximately 149°C (300°F), but even if emitted, the 	 j
TDI would react rapidly with internal OWS moisture to produce far less toxic
amines.	 Specific diagnosis for TDI prior to ingress by the Skylab I g rew showed
no presence of TDI.
i Against that background of extreme urgency, the JSC parasol was easil,"
the most logical means of gaining some immediate relief without the risk of 	 3
early EVA.
a
After the JSC parasol was deployed on May 27, 1973, the internal
temperatures decreased 16.7 0 C ( 30°P) in two days.	 The crew, However,
observed that the shield did not completely open, and a day after the deployment,
flight data began. to differ from that predicted analytically by the thermal model.
During the SL-1/3L-2 storage period the temperatare reached 30.7° C (98 0 F)	 1
during a high Beta angle period. 	 During departure of Shylab II crew, fly-around
pi " otos confirmed that the actual shad.: coverage was only 75 percent (Fig. 0).
With the parasol shield, as deployed, solar heating overloaded the
Environmental Control .System ( 1);('S) and internal temperatures became exces-
sive at high Beta angles. e When the MSFC SAIL II was deployed over the parasol
on June 19, 1973, the OWS external wall temperature dropped 50 ° C ( 100°F)
within the first fete hours, and the OWS mean internal temperature decreased
immediately by about 3.9 ° C (70 F).	 Thereafter, the internal temperatures
fluctuated in response to Skylab attitide changes, but the combined parasol and
sail thermal shield composite maintained the internal temperature within the
established habitability "comfort box" most of the time, allowing the operation
of heat generating experiments and other equipment through the completion of
the Skylab mission.
S. "'Skylab Overheating Wall Material Degradation Studies," Materials Division,
MSFC, May 15-29, 1973.
1 D. "MSFC Skylab Thermal and Environmental Control Sy^tLm Mission Evalua-
tion Report," Ilopson, Littles and Patterson, NASA Technical Memorandum
X-01:82'.:.
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FIt (UrIlCd out th:lt, lilac the parasol, the saLl was also luconlpletoby
deployed, and only hl) percent of the O WS sidewali was covered. This was due
itlrgeky to ere:lses in the Sall which refusud to flatten out completely after the
long storage period experienced before deployment (70 days in the folded condl-
Lion). I ly.-around photos Indicated also that more "simian" could pessibly P:avc
been enlployou by slightly difforent design. While neither of file shields was
perfect, the combinution of the two did the job nlculy.
The decision to deploy the snit over the par:lsol was a crucial one which
took into necount seveMI factors of considerably import:nice, and was intended
to provide additional safety margin. .Parasol aid SAIL materials properties
anti deployment conditions which were Of concern and influenced thaL final
decision, 1vC'm
1. G'.1'-713 material L?VAMOnnihl solar degradation affecting:
a. Breaking strength in the w:n• p (weake-,A) direction of the matorial.
b. Elongation in the warp dLrcuLiun.
c. Changing a and c with exposure Linle.
3. Alech:Ilie:rl c.onsidGMtions such as violcuL flapping of tile parasol
edge nearest the TAC uozvly , when the TACS fired, and the additional flexing
of the GT-70 material duo to the 1'loxibility of the estendod telescoping support
tubes.
3. Possible degvaclation of the Alylar on the flwS side of the A1S)! G SAIL
II clue to earth aibedo radiation.
The general trend of degradation of Lhe GT-76 material breaking strength
(1 hg. 15) is shown is the warp (weakest) direction with continued LIW/vacuum
exposure as cleternhillUd in Lhe ground toSts. luiLkIlly, this was considered quite
alarming because the milliutum strongth required Just hasn't known.
Dynamic sLroct °Aral analyses of Lhe fiapping of [lie parasol from the 'TACS
firiug finally concluded LhaL 5 pounds-per-inch of width strength would be
adequate to prevent Lcaring, but Lhere was great retucUrnee, ill general, to allow
that 1LniL to be approached. Tho 4000-hour data. point shows Lhe result of It
measurement taken on a sample of GT-76 parasol material reLurned from Skylah.
This point shows slightly higher eLrengLh hemainfag than the proloeted carves of
the ground ba:'cd data would imply. Almo.,k all the ground Lc:,L 14W e vacuum Lest
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Until shOwcd a WHLimlcy to be sliglILly more severe 1 - 1 1 1111 the a0,1301 Orbital COnd[-
Lion. This CoUld 01111' be COUCluded in retrospect, however. since UV sOUrcc
U p (] Lntoasity, substrate Lc11lperatur	 au, and chamber Cold will[ rrlulgomcnL were
infhluntial factors in the ground test data; actual Lest a011ditluns were carcfully
anted so [hat, flight, data uuulpar p sons could be tuade later. :Flight samples have
given rise to continued CesLs, regarding properties, which are still ht prugress
at the Limo Of this writing.
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showed n1i atar111f11g lendeaey to d0creu:^e with incrca Cd exposure. Thi  raise[[
Coaeel^n about Lhc brittleness, primaril y of 1110'_1 1'1-11111 ripstop Nylon and 1 ^3-
mil At0ar 01' Il)o C;T. 711 11Taterial being exposed to the sun.
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Figure 16. GT- 71'6 room temporatRCO clongnliou ill percent versus M"vacuum
exposure in equitalont sun hours (110on to ;run, warp tllreulioD).
The cha11ec in the dt,' rntio (Fig. 1 7) is shown fur the GT-76 nlni.erial.
This ratio was obtained from ground based	 t.estdlg. 7110 I801:11ed
(kiln point at, the rihht is a rCLurned 31p^lnb sample data point.
L:trlr tests or breakin- slrenglh and el0ngn1-io11 shOWL'd 111110 C11m1ge for
the S- 13G covcrcd MAID material or the AISFC SAIL 11, as expoe[etl, s0 1(x1'11
titn'nlion tests Of [110SC pr0pertics WOrC not condUctud. Bmiuse the a-mil S- MG
Coating,
 prOvided Complete opacity ( measured tt':tnsndl(ancC awns 0. 1 percent in
the 2000-1000 A canoe) Lhorc was 110 (1C9tatlat1Dn Of [he NV"1011 NI)SIOp, nHd
altmli0iVC(1 mylar substrate.
Figures 1S and 19 show the breaking strength and elongation of the
1HSFC SAIL 11 material tested Lo 4100 ESII, after which Lhe tests Were terminated
since 110 nppreciable, Change Was noted.
An early concern Was I%lisud about the possibility of degradation of the
backside of the NlSFC SAIL 11 resulting from enrlh's albedo ralial:ion, since the
sail material "ONVS side" layer of 4110, material c0ulposite lwtts 1-"4-11111 Alylar.
Again, U\" "y aCUUn1 0ylosur0 testing was Conducted to determine the effect on
brcalcblo strength, elum"ation tuul a t. 0f the Csp0sur0 Of the u11dor side of the.
SAIL to the sun. Timeline estimates ludicated nut 9IbSOIUte Illaximnn of about.
50 110111': CaposurC Of Lhe underside of the sail to the sa111, to the end of the Slab°Iab
mission, S0 expustu•e to One hund r ed 1;511 lwas CDnstdered quite atlCquatC.
r.
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Figure 10. hISFC SAIL II elongation versus UVwacuum exposure
(S-13G to stilt).
Figures 20, 21, and 22 show the breaking strength, elongation, and a/c
for the 100-hour UV/vacuum around test exposure. Interestingly, the strength
and elongation properties of the S-13G coated hISFC SAIL 1I actually did not vary
much with direction (warp or fill) of the Nylon ripstop weave orientation during
the test because the coating tended to distribute the load more evenly. It
turned out that breaking strength and elongation slid not change appreciably
either, for the MSlar backside irradiated SAIL material, but the ce le of the
hlylar did change as expected. The absorbtance a changed from 0. tS to 0.27
while the emittance held constant. This shows again the great propensity for
change of a/c of Alylar in a UV/Vacuum environment. At any rate these tests
showed that fears about the damaging effects of earth's aibedo oil 	 backside
of the MSFC SAIL II were gtvundleSS. Furthermore, it turned out that by deploy-
ing the sail over the parasol, the backside of the sail was well covered anyway.
Ill
	
the potential UV/vaCUUm degradation of the MSFC SAIL II, S- 13G
UV/vacuum degradation data already existed at the time of the thermal shield
all-out effort.
Figure 23 shows absorptance (a) data from IIT1II (Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology Research Institute) for contaminated S-13G at 7.2 00 (45°F) Substrate temp-
erature and 67.3°C (153°F) substrate temperature, some early AThlflight data, and
a data point from a Skylab returned sample of S-13G coated NNlD material which
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Figure 20. NISFG SAIL II broaldng strength versus UN' vncuum
exposure (A\ vlar to Sun).
had "seen" 117G ESII in urbiL. It Ls Interesting to note that the conLaminnted
S- 13Gdata from the ground Costing tracked so well for the 5-13G coating on the
ATAI, and the rec.ovcrucl flight sample. Eartior laboraLOI;V cinta on absoh1(01±'
clean 's- NOinatcrial showed vct^v little dohradalion In 4000 ESII, but ;Ill
IndicaLiuns are that eontantitnation somewhat I1111uonecd the pertormaucu of the
8- W(3on the ALSFC Sr1IL it, a,s wall as othor surfaces on Skvlab which wore
painted with S- 13G. Fortunalely , the Ihernril performance of the ti-13G material
was still relatively good in spite of a du ng rue of conGUnination.
31
a
i
aOSFC al
SUNS AT 70,4 C 10S FI
K
O
H
O2OJW
O'S
OA
z
0.3
® MVLAR
b 5436
	
0 0
	 20	 40_	 60	 RO	 100
UVRVAC EXPOSURE, ESH
rie;ure 3 1. MSFC SAIL II clangatinn VOVSUS L\'&nULIunl espesurc
( Alylar to Sun).
OSFC. 91
15 SUNS AT 29.4`C (85'Fl
	
06	
—A
0,2 G^
0	 ,
0	 20	 40	 GO	 60	 100
-	
JWVAr EXPOSURE, ESH
Fli';Urc 22. MS1 C SAIL Il (v L VCrSUS C4 ,"vaeuum
eepmSurc (igy lar to Sun).
32
j1
(1
ll
I
ii)r
4
I±
0.4
u
z
m 03
qQ¢
SS
a
o,z
IITIII 7,2'C (WF) CONTAMINATED S-130
0 , 1 ,:	 IITIII 67.2'L' 1163'FI CONTAMINATED 5430
ATM FLIGHT
p
+
v	 S43G ON NMD SKVLAB RETURNED FLIGHT SAWLE
0 —
EQUIVALENT SUN HOURS
Figure 23. a-13G thermal c unLrol material IT vs. E811
(ground and flight data).
33
x
TAPPEND IX -TESTS PERFORMED FOR MSFC SAIL 11 DEVELOPMENT
1. S- 13G coated Nh1D ( hISF C SAIL) butt tensile Lesls.
.).. S- 13C,coated NMI) ( hISPC SAIL) 180 dog peel tests.
113. S- 13G coated NMI) ( hISI C SAIL) ,sUeklness ( unfolding) tests.
4. GT-Ili material brealang strength tests.
5. GT-76 material te_r strength tests.
U. GT-76 nuacrial elongation tests.
7. U.635-cm ( U.25 in.) dianneler 11 131 ropc breaking strength tests.
3. U. 635-cm ( 0.25 In.) dtametor PBI rope modulus lost,,,.
9. U. 635-um ( 0. 25-iu.) diameter P13I ropc lennth change LesL:4 under static
load with tomperalure cycling.
10. 0.13:35-can ( 0.35-in.) diameter Teflon coated Beta gross rope modules under
loam load conditions.
11. U. 035-cm (U. 23-hit.) dianncter Teflon con Led I3cla glass rope modulus under
high load conditions.
12. 0.3175-cm ( U. 125-in.) diameter Teflon coaled Beta glass cord un-irradiaLed
breaking strength tests.
13. U.3175-cm (U. 125-in.) diameter Teflon emitted I Lta glass cord un-Irradiated
elongation tests.
ld. 0.3175-cm (0. 125-in.) diameter Teflon coated Beta glass cord UV Irradiated
breaking strength tests.
15. U. 3175-cm (0. 125-in.) diameter Teflon coaled Beta glass curd U% 1 irradiated
elongation tests.
16. Un till W) C SAIL hardWau •c — strength of rope splices and pull-out strength
of hardware.
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APPENDIX (Continued)
17. Compatibility tests of film and coatings with other coating solvents and
cleaning fluids.
18. Continuous precision weight measurements on films, coatings and SAIL
hardware.
19. Effect of UV and vacuum on SAIL material breaking strength.
20. Effect of UV and vacuum on SAIL material elongation.
21. Effect of UV and vacuum on SAIL material flexibility.
22. Effect of UV and vacuum on SAIL material a and C.
23. Effect of UV and vacuum on SAIL material solar transmittance.
24. Effect of UV and vacuum on SAIL material weight change..
25. Effect of UV and vacuum on SAIL material particle generation propensity.
26. Microphotogral.hic examination of UV degraded SAIL materials and photos.
27. Thermal cycling tests of MSFC, JSC, Armalon, etc., materials, -10f C
(-150°F) to Room Temperature (RT) in air.
28. Thermal cycling tests of MSFC, JSC, Armalon, etc., materials, RT to
121° C (+2500 F) in vacuum.
29. Flexibility tests of S-13G coated NMD at LN 2 temperature.
30. RT to LN2 temperature cyclic tests of GT-70, fluorel GT-70 and S-13G
coated MID.
31. Outgassing ( 5UN102442) testing of MDAC Teflon coated Beta fiberglass,
Fluorel coated GT-70, S-13G on 'Pedlar, S-13G on NN1D, GT-70 alone and the
red and green paint used for identification on SAILS.
:32. S- 13G coated NMD "sti^king," or tack tests in vacuwu under 10.3 Nlcni2
(.15-psi) load.
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APPENDIX (Concluded)
33. 10 standard spacecraft flammability tests of S-13G coated NNID, GT-76
alone and Teflon coated fibergalss (duct material).
34. 040 measurements of a and a on 31 materials.
35. Evacuation of packed "worst case" Kapton SAIL to determine air retention
characteristics.
36. Evacuation of packed S-13G coated NMD SAIL to determine air retention
characteristics.
37. Toxicity test of S-13G cuated GT-76.
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iAPPROVAL
PERFORMANCE OF SOLAR SHIELDS
By Robert J. SchwingliamerJJ
The information in this report has been reviewed for security classifi-
cation. Review of any information concerning Department of Defense or
i'	 Atomic Energy Commission programs yias been made by the MSFC Security
Classification Officer. This report, in its entirety, has been determined to be
unclassified.
This document has also been reviewed and approved for technical
accuracy.
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